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98 N.C. L. REV. 1447 (2020) 
Hate, Interstate: The Fourth Circuit, Hate Crimes, and the 
Commerce Clause in United States v. Hill* 
The past twenty-five years have seen a dramatic reevaluation of the judiciary’s 
understanding of the Commerce Clause, hallmarked by a categorical approach 
to activity the Clause can reach. Congress has adapted as well, attempting to 
shore up the constitutionality of legislation by including language aimed at tying 
regulated activity to the Clause’s categorical jurisdiction (so-called 
“jurisdictional elements”). Some courts have struggled in squaring these 
categorical limits with a traditionally broad understanding of Commerce Clause 
power. The Fourth Circuit’s conviction of James Hill for a bias-motivated 
assault was one such struggle. This Recent Development argues that the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hill improperly analyzed Hill’s 
conviction under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act in a manner unmoored from 
Commerce Clause precedent.  
INTRODUCTION: UNITED STATES V. HILL 
Amazon opened its Chester, Virginia, facility in 2012. 1 The expansive 
facility is responsible for storing, packaging, and shipping millions of products 
with help from the 2200 (or as many as 3200 depending on the season) 
employees that roam the 1.2 million square-foot warehouse floor.2 On May 22, 
2015, that same floor was wiped clean of Curtis Tibbs’s blood.3 
Tibbs was a fulfillment associate for Amazon. 4 Colloquially known as 
“packers,” these employees are responsible for moving items from conveyor 
belts, scanning them, and boxing them for movement to other locations 
throughout the facility.5 It was in the midst of this boxing that Tibbs was 
violently assaulted. 6  Surveillance footage from the warehouse showed the 
assailant—fellow Amazon employee James Hill—approaching Tibbs from 
behind as Tibbs was carrying packages. 7  Without warning, Hill repeatedly 
punched Tibbs in the face leaving him with bruises, cuts, and a bloody nose.8 
 
 *  © 2020 Drew Bencie. 
 1. John Reid Blackwell, A Look Inside One of Amazon’s Warehouses in Virginia, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (May 18, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/dbb079b6655d4a73a1b8659423a4e67e [https:// 
perma.cc/8WUY-35ML]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 4. Id. at 193. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 194. 
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During subsequent questioning by an Amazon investigator and a police officer, 
Hill freely admitted that he “didn’t like homosexuals,” and that he believed 
Tibbs disrespected him “because he is a homosexual.”9 That justification for the 
assault gave rise to a novel constitutional question. 
In United States v. Hill,10 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court 
to evaluate the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA” or “Act”)11 as applied to an unarmed 
assault of a victim engaged in activity at his place of work. The court’s analysis 
disregarded and misapplied precedent to achieve a just outcome for Tibbs’s 
bias-motivated assault, pushing the Commerce Clause beyond its constitutional 
bearings in the process. 
This Recent Development explores the flawed analysis of the Fourth 
Circuit with a specific critique of its reliance on Taylor v. United States12 and its 
focus on the presence of (yet lack of analysis of) a jurisdictional hook provision. 
Part I provides an overview of Hill’s prosecution and the related provisions of 
the HCPA. Part II provides relevant background on the modern, foundational 
Commerce Clause cases. Part III analyzes the Fourth Circuit opinion in Hill. 
Finally, Part IV recommends an alternative constitutional approach for 
regulating hate crimes and questions whether increased penalties for hate crimes 
achieves the goal of future prevention. 
I.  THE HCPA AND THE CHARGE AGAINST HILL 
By most accounts, Hill’s assault of Tibbs would be considered a hate crime, 
which the Justice Department defines in simple terms as “a crime + motivation 
for committing the crime based on bias.” 13  Accordingly, the analysis is 
straightforward. Hill committed assault—a crime. When asked why he 
committed assault, he told investigators he did not like gay people, 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019).  
 11. Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. E, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 12. 136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016). 
 13. Learn About Hate Crimes, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-about-
hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/N3SL-R6VV]. More specifically, hate crimes require that the 
motivating bias be unlawful under relevant statutory law. Harbani Ahuja, Note, The Vicious Cycle of 
Hate: Systemic Flaws in Hate Crime Documentation in the United States and the Impact on Minority 
Communities, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 1867, 1870–71 (2016) (“Every hate crime consists of two 
elements: first, the perpetrator must commit a crime; and second, the perpetrator must have been 
motivated by an unlawful bias that is protected by hate crimes laws. The bias motive is what makes 
hate crimes distinct: the victims of hate crimes are selected as targets due to some actual or perceived 
protected characteristic such as race, gender, disability, religion, or sexual orientation.”).  
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demonstrating bias.14 Hill did not even attempt to provide another justification 
for the assault.15 Therefore, Hill committed a hate crime. 
While the superficial analysis is simple, the prosecution was not. That is 
because Virginia’s hate crime provision for assault and battery does not include 
sexual orientation16 as one of the classes protected by the statute.17 Initially, Hill 
was charged only with misdemeanor assault.18 The state prosecutor, seeing an 
opportunity for greater penalties, referred the case for federal prosecution under 
the HCPA.19 The Act, passed in 2009, was motivated in part by two notable 
crimes.20 Its namesakes, Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., were the victims 
of brutal and highly publicized bias-motivated tortures and murders—
Shephard’s based on his sexual orientation and Byrd’s based on his race.21 
The specific provision of the HCPA used against Hill imposes criminal 
liability when an individual 
willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a 
firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, 
attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or 
perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability of any person.22 
But this is only the first step of an HCPA charge. Since the HCPA was 
passed under the auspices of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 23 
conviction under the Act requires that the crime also involve at least one of the 
Act’s “jurisdictional hooks” to support conviction. In Commerce Clause 
legislation, a jurisdictional hook (sometimes referred to as a jurisdictional 
 
 14. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194. 
 15. See id. 
 16. The statute provides increased criminal penalties “if a person intentionally selects the person 
against whom an assault and battery resulting in bodily injury is committed because of his race, religious 
conviction, color or national origin.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(B) (LexisNexis current through the 
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). 
 17. Id. 
 18. United States v. Hill, 182 F. Supp. 3d 546, 548 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 700 F. 
App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 19. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194. 
 20. See Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, CNN POL. (Oct. 28, 2009, 7:39 PM), https:// 
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/10/28/hate.crimes/ [https://perma.cc/E6CC-B6AW] (discussing the 
murders of Matthew Shepherd and James Byrd, Jr.). 
 21. See Audra Burch, In Texas, a Decades-Old Hate Crime, Forgiven but Never Forgotten, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/james-byrd-jasper-texas-killing.html 
[https://perma.cc/59EP-J62V (dark archive)]; Jude Sheerin, Matthew Shephard: The Murder That 
Changed America, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45968606 
[https://perma.cc/CS97-M46V]. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2018). 
 23. Article I Section 8 of the Constitution provides one of Congress’s enumerated legislative 
powers as the ability to regulate “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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element) is the part of a statute included to tie the regulated behavior to the 
enumerated power, therefore allowing Congress to regulate the behavior. 24 
These provisions, in theory, allow for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of 
the Act’s application on a case-by-case basis. 
The HCPA contains four such jurisdictional hooks.25 The hook used in 
Hill’s conviction requires that, in addition to showing bodily injury and biased 
motivation, the prosecution must also show: “the conduct . . . interferes with 
commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the 
time of the conduct; or . . . otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.”26 
Note that the jurisdictional element contains two pathways for showing 
connection to commerce: the bodily injury may either (1) interfere with 
commercial or economic activity, or (2) “otherwise affect[]” interstate 
commerce. The indictment and eventual conviction of Hill rested on 18 U.S.C. 
§ 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I),27 requiring that the assault and battery interfere with 
commercial or economic activity in which Tibbs was engaged in at the time.28 
The district court dismissed the indictment as unconstitutional on 
Commerce Clause grounds. 29  However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
dismissal and reinstated the indictment in an unpublished opinion. 30  The 
reinstated indictment alleged that 
 
 24. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A jurisdictional element, as 
the term has been used in and after Lopez, refers to a provision in a federal statute that requires the 
government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in connection with 
any individual application of the statute.”); Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional 
Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1153 (2003) (“Congress sometimes 
chooses to include in its statutes a ‘jurisdictional nexus’—that is, a requirement that the government 
prove that the acts to which a statute is applied in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.”); 
Tara M. Stuckey, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of 
Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2102 (2006) (“A jurisdictional hook is a statutory 
clause requiring that the regulated activity have a connection with interstate commerce.”). 
 25. The HCPA’s four hooks allow for a prosecution when the bias-motivated bodily injury (1) 
occurred as a result or during the victim or defendant’s travel across a state or national border or while 
using a channel or facility of interstate commerce; (2) was caused by the defendant using an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with the conduct; (3) was caused with a weapon 
that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or (4) interfered with commercial or economic 
activity that the victim was engaged in at the time or otherwise affected interstate or foreign commerce. 
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B).  
 26. Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)–(II). 
 27. Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (requiring that the crime “otherwise affects interstate or foreign 
commerce”). The original crime against Hill also included this § 249(2)(B)(iv)(II) charge. However, 
the government dropped the charge on remand and solely relied on the language tying the crime to 
interference with commercial conduct the victim was engaged in at the time of the crime. United States 
v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 28. Hill, 927 F.3d at 195. 
 29. United States v. Hill, 182 F. Supp. 3d 546, 555–556 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 700 
F. App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 30. Hill, 700 F. App’x at 238. 
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on or about May 22, 2015 . . . [Defendant] did willfully cause bodily 
injury to [Tibbs] by assaulting [Tibbs], including by punching [Tibbs], 
because of [Tibbs’s] actual and perceived sexual orientation, namely that 
he is gay; and that, in connection with the offense, [Defendant] [1] 
interfered with commercial and other economic activity in which [Tibbs] was 
engaged at the time of the conduct.31 
After a two-day trial in district court following remand, the jury found 
Hill guilty and determined that Hill caused bodily injury to Tibbs, that he did 
so willfully, that he did so because of Hill’s perceived sexual orientation, and 
that his action “interfered with the commercial or economic activity in which 
Tibbs was engaged at the time of the conduct.”32 Hill then moved for acquittal 
on similar grounds to those of his original dismissal: namely, that the HCPA as 
applied exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.33 The district court 
agreed and acquitted Hill.34 The government appealed and the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the acquittal.35 
The Fourth Circuit, looking to the foundational cases of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence for guidance, found that Hill’s conviction was sufficiently 
connected to commerce. 36  In doing so, the court improperly upheld the 
provision of the HCPA that supported his conviction, holding that the 
existence of the jurisdictional elements was sufficient for constitutionality.37  
As much of the court’s reasoning stems from the essential Commerce 
Clause precedent, it is helpful in analyzing the Hill court’s holding to discuss 
the broad holdings and implications of each relevant case. We begin, as the 
Fourth Circuit did, with United States v. Lopez.38 
 
 31. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 195 (internal quotations omitted). 
 33. Id. at 194. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 195, 210. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 204 (“[W]hereas the Lopez and Morrison Courts found it significant that the statutes at 
issue had no interstate-commerce jurisdictional element, the provision in the Hate Crimes Act under 
which the jury convicted Defendant expressly includes such an element. That element requires that, to 
convict a defendant under the Hate Crimes Act, both a court and a fact-finder must determine, in each 
case, that the defendant’s conduct ‘interfere[d] with commercial or other economic activity in which 
the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct.’ Notably, Defendant has not identified any case—nor 
have we found any such case—in which a federal criminal statute including an interstate commerce 
jurisdictional element has been held to exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (2018)) (citing United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 620 
(6th Cir. 2012))).  
 38. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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II.  BACK TO BASICS: THE RELEVANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES 
In Lopez, the Supreme Court sought to articulate the “few and defined” 
powers delegated to Congress under the Commerce Clause.39 There, when 
evaluating the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act,40 the Court 
identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under 
its commerce power.”41 The first category allows regulation of “the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce.”42 This category includes regulation of roads 
and other infrastructure used in interstate commerce.43 The second category 
outlined in Lopez allows the regulation of “the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce.” 44  This category 
includes vehicles as well as objects in commerce.45 Finally, and most generally, 
the third category allows Congressional regulation of “activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce.” 46  This third category includes 
intrastate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”47 
Importantly, the Lopez Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act, 
which criminalized possession of a firearm in a school zone, was an 
unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause since the statute “by its terms has 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”48 Additionally, the Court determined 
that “[the statutory provision] contains no jurisdictional element which would 
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce.”49 In essence, the Court found that the lack of a 
“jurisdictional hook” cut against the State’s case that possession of a firearm in 
a school zone was sufficiently tied to commerce. Notably, however, the Court 
did not indicate that the mere inclusion of a jurisdictional element would have 
rendered the statutory provision constitutional.50 
 
 39. Id. at 558. 
 40. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1701, 104 Stat. 4944, invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, and amended 
by Treasury Department Appropriation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. 6, § 657, 110 Stat. 
3009-369, 3009-369 to 3009-371 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2018)). 
 41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–56 (1964) (holding 
that the Commerce Clause could be used to regulate an intrastate motel because it qualified as a channel 
of interstate commerce); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause could be used to regulate “immoral” criminal activity utilizing interstate roadways). 
 44. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 45. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 90–91 (1824) (holding that vehicles are 
integral to and thus regulable as commerce). 
 46. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 561. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. This idea is confirmed in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See infra note 56 
and accompanying text. 
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The second major case relevant to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is United 
States v. Morrison. 51  In Morrison, the Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”) 52 that provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence. 53 
There, the Court reaffirmed the three Lopez categories of activity regulable by 
the Commerce Clause while also addressing the question of bias-motivated 
violent crimes by holding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, 
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”54 In finding the VAWA civil 
remedy provision unconstitutional, the Court “reject[ed] the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on 
that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 55  The Court also 
confirmed that a jurisdictional hook is probative but not determinative, finding 
that “a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance 
of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce.”56 
The Fourth Circuit also turned to Gonzales v. Raich57 to support its holding 
in Hill. 58 In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief prohibiting the 
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act59 as applied to their personal 
growth and consumption of marijuana for medical use. 60  In evaluating 
Congress’s power to regulate the marijuana market under the third Lopez 
category, 61  the Court held that precedent “establishes Congress’s power to 
regulate purely local activities that are a part of an economic ‘class of activities’ 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”62 Though the growth of 
marijuana for personal use was not economic per se, Congress is permitted to 
regulate it as a class of activity that “would undercut the regulation of the 
interstate market in that commodity.”63 
With the constitutional table set, we now turn to Hill. 
 
 51. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941–42 (1994) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
 53. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02. 
 54. Id. at 613. 
 55. Id. at 617. 
 56. Id. at 612 (emphasis added). 
 57. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 58. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 198 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 59. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
844(a) (2018)). 
 60. Raich, 545 U.S. at 8. 
 61. This third category is the power to regulate activities that “substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
 62. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (first quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); and then 
quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)). 
 63. Id. at 18. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 1447 (2020) 
1454 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
III.  WHAT THE HILL? 
The Fourth Circuit assures us that Congress paid close attention to the 
scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause when adopting the HCPA.64 
Unfortunately, the same close attention does not appear in the Fourth Circuit’s 
Hill decision. As the court correctly notes, “[w]hether the Hate Crimes Act may 
be constitutionally applied to an unarmed assault of a victim engaged in 
commercial activity at his place of work appears to be an issue of first impression 
in this Circuit or any other.” 65  As such, the court was left only with the 
foundational Commerce Clause cases as well as disparate analogous case law to 
decide the question. However, given the court’s reasoning, a reader would be 
forgiven for believing that one such analogous case, Taylor v. United States,66 
was directly on point. That treatment proves problematic.  
A. The Hill Majority’s Interpretation and Application of Taylor Is Misguided 
In Taylor, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a 
prosecution under the Hobbs Act,67 which “ma[de] it a crime for a person to 
affect commerce, or attempt to do so by robbery or extortion.”68 There, the 
defendant and other gang members broke into the homes of marijuana dealers 
and demanded the location of drugs and money. 69  In their analysis, the 
Supreme Court found that since the Raich decision upheld congressional 
authority to regulate marijuana, and since the Hobbs Act criminalized robbery 
interfering with commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction, the 
prosecution was within the bounds of the Commerce Clause.70 In the Fourth 
Circuit’s interpretation, “Taylor, therefore, establishes that, pursuant to its 
power under the Commerce Clause, Congress may proscribe violent conduct 
when such conduct interferes with or otherwise affects commerce over which 
Congress has jurisdiction.”71 
The Fourth Circuit’s reading of Taylor in Hill is exceedingly and 
conveniently broad. Close reading of the Taylor opinion leaves one struggling 
to determine where, if at all, the Supreme Court “establishes” this Commerce 
Clause power as the Fourth Circuit claims. In fact, what is notable about the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis is not what it says about Taylor but what it does not. 
The Fourth Circuit disregards crucial pieces of Taylor in its analysis: the most 
egregious exclusion being the Supreme Court’s insistence that “[their] holding 
 
 64. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 196–97 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 65. Id. at 198. 
 66. 136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016). 
 67. Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018)). 
 68. Id. at 2084 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018)). 
 69. Id. at 2078. 
 70. Id. at 2080. 
 71. Hill, 927 F.3d at 199. 
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today is limited to cases in which the defendant targets drug dealers for the 
purpose of stealing drugs or drug proceeds.”72 It would appear that the Supreme 
Court, careful so as not to disturb established Commerce Clause precedent, 
expressly sought to withhold the very grant of authority on which the Fourth 
Circuit relies. 
Moreover, the Taylor Court concluded that “[b]ecause Congress may 
regulate these intrastate [drug] activities based on their aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce, it follows that Congress may also regulate intrastate drug 
theft.” 73  Note the emphasis contained in the opinion on the specific crime 
targeted by the Hobbs Act rather than extrapolation to “violent conduct” 
generally. This distinction between specific and general crime was emphasized 
by the Taylor Court when it focused on the profit-motivated language used by 
the defendant who asked the victim “where the money was at, where the weed 
was at.”74 The Supreme Court’s focus on the economic nature of the crime at 
issue in Taylor does not appear to support the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that 
the Commerce Clause applies to “violent conduct” in general. This derails the 
Fourth Circuit’s attempt to use Taylor as controlling precedent in Hill given the 
fundamentally different nature of the crimes at issue. 
The Fourth Circuit attempts to reconcile this economic versus violent 
crime distinction, yet its analysis falls short. In justifying its use of Taylor 
despite the obvious difference in the nature of the respective crime (robbery in 
the case of Taylor and assault in Hill), the Fourth Circuit claims that the 
“economic nature” argument in Taylor “rests on the incorrect premise that the 
actus reus proscribed by a federal criminal statute must be ‘inherently economic’ 
in order for the statute to comply with the Commerce Clause.”75 In other words, 
the Fourth Circuit strains to use Taylor while rejecting its central holding—that 
“[a]s long as Congress may regulate the purely intrastate possession and sale of 
illegal drugs, Congress may criminalize the theft or attempted theft of those same 
drugs.”76 
This dissonance is especially confusing given that the Fourth Circuit itself 
recognizes that precedent weighs in favor of regulating crimes with an economic 
actus reus. In fact, the Fourth Circuit argues that “the Hate Crimes Act’s 
interstate commerce element ensures that the statute regulates only economic, 
violent criminal conduct, not the type of ‘noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct’ at issue in Morrison.” 77  In sum, the Fourth Circuit states that an 
 
 72. Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2082 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. at 2076. 
 74. Id. at 2080. 
 75. Hill, 927 F.3d at 205, 207. 
 76. Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081 (emphasis added).  
 77. Hill, 927 F.3d at 204 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)). 
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economic actus reus is irrelevant78 while simultaneously relying on cases that 
make a clear distinction between economic and non-economic criminal 
conduct.79 
To accomplish this, the Fourth Circuit analogizes the HCPA to the Hobbs 
Act at issue in Taylor, telling us that “[t]he Hobbs Act . . . compl[ies] with the 
Commerce Clause . . . not because robbery . . . [is] ‘inherently economic,’ but 
rather because [it] contain[s] [a] jurisdictional element[] that limit[s] the 
statute[’s] reach to those robberies . . . that interfere with or affect interstate 
commerce.”80 The Fourth Circuit treats the specific crimes the Hobbs Act 
addresses as if they are somehow ancillary and not the target of a legislature 
that likely considered its power under the Commerce Clause and made 
decisions not only about the jurisdictional element but also the regulated crimes 
themselves. In fact, the history of the Hobbs Act reveals that it originated as an 
amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act81 to weaken exceptions that 
the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act provided to labor union activity.82 Therefore, 
even assuming that robbery is not inherently economic (as unintuitive an 
assumption as it seems), the robbery initially contemplated and targeted by the 
Hobbs Act dealt with labor unions resorting to violence in order to exact wages.83 
This stands in stark contrast to the violent conduct implicated by the HCPA—
bias-motivated assault. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s discussion ignores the Hobbs Act’s 
statutory requirement that any violence that was not “robbery or extortion” be 
“in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this 
section.”84 The statutory language in the Hobbs Act makes clear that Congress 
knew of and made a distinction between economic and noneconomic crimes. 
Independent of any jurisdictional hook, the Hobbs Act required that these 
noneconomic crimes be in furtherance of the economic crimes85 for liability to 
attach.86 Similar language is plainly absent from the HCPA. This cuts strongly 
 
 78. Id. at 205 (“[W]hether the application of a federal statute proscribing violent crime complies 
with the Commerce Clause does not turn on whether the act proscribed by the statute is ‘economic’ or 
‘non-economic.’’’). 
 79. See discussion infra pp. 111–12. 
 80. Hill, 927 F.3d at 205–06. The court also discusses a federal arson statute upheld on similar 
grounds. Arson, of course, is a crime against property, rendering it “economic” not only in its nature but 
by its nature. As the Hobbs Act more specifically addresses crimes against persons, this Recent 
Development will not address the simpler arson example. 
 81. Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018)). 
 82. In fact, the language in the Act would punish members of a labor union attempting to exact 
wages through force and violence or threats thereof, which the Teamsters’ Union did in New York. 
William B. Aycock, The Hobbs Act–An Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 25 N.C. L. REV. 
58, 58–60 (1946). 
 83. Id. at 58.  
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018). 
 85. Recall that the Hobbs Act targets “robbery or extortion” explicitly. Id.  
 86. Id. 
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against the Fourth Circuit’s claim that Taylor applies and that the 
constitutionality of the Hobbs Act has any bearing on the HCPA. 
There is reason to believe that the Fourth Circuit rushed to justify its 
reliance on Taylor to avoid issues raised by Morrison. As previously discussed, 
Morrison—one of the Supreme Court’s essential Commerce Clause cases—
definitively determined that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in 
any sense of the phrase, economic activity” and were thus beyond the reach of 
the Commerce Clause.87 Compare this to the Taylor Court’s ruling, which was 
supported “[b]ecause Congress may regulate these intrastate [drug] activities 
based on their aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 88  The natural 
conclusion under Morrison would be to simply determine that orientation-
motivated crimes of violence are also “not in any sense of the phrase” economic 
activity. Had the Fourth Circuit not relied on Taylor, the prosecution likely 
would have failed under the standard articulated in Morrison. 
B. The Jurisdictional Hook Is Insufficient To Subject Hill to Criminal Liability 
Under the Commerce Clause 
Fear not, says the Fourth Circuit, “for several reasons, Lopez and Morrison 
are readily distinguishable from Defendant’s prosecution under the Hate 
Crimes Act.”89 The “several reasons” are, for all intents and purposes, one 
reason: the HCPA features a jurisdictional hook provision that requires an 
additional showing of relation to commerce.90 To be fair, the Fourth Circuit is 
correct in its statement that the precedential cases “found it significant that the 
statutes at issue [in Lopez and Morrison] had no interstate-commerce 
jurisdictional element.”91 
The court is incorrect, however, in abandoning any evaluation under Lopez 
and Morrison at the mere presence of a jurisdictional element. While the court 
noted that the defendant “has not identified any case—nor ha[s] [the Fourth 
Circuit] found any such case—in which a federal criminal statute including an 
interstate commerce jurisdictional element has been held to exceed Congress’s 
authority under the Commerce Clause,” the court itself failed to identify any 
binding precedent to conclude that the existence of a jurisdictional hook alone 
is sufficient for constitutionality.92 In fact, the court appears to have carefully 
selected its persuasive authority to avoid confronting that very question, 
referring to a Sixth Circuit decision that “regard[ed] the presence of such a 
jurisdictional element [that ensures case-by-case analysis that the violation in 
 
 87. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
 88. Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (2016). 
 89. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 90. Id. at 204–05. 
 91. Id. at 204. 
 92. Id. 
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question affects interstate commerce] as the touchstone of valid congressional 
use of its Commerce Clause powers to regulate non-commercial activity.”93 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit could have also considered the Third Circuit’s 
opinion in United States v. Rodia,94 which accurately noted that “[holding] that 
the presence of a jurisdictional element automatically ensures the 
constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact that the connection between the 
activity regulated and the jurisdictional hook may be so attenuated as to fail to 
guarantee that the activity regulated has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.” 95  Other jurisdictions have similarly reacted skeptically to the 
argument that inclusion is synonymous with constitutionality.96 
The Fourth Circuit’s lack of analysis beyond recognizing that the HCPA 
contains a jurisdictional element represents the precise situation the Third 
Circuit feared.97 Any analysis of the jurisdictional element at play in Hill’s 
prosecution would reveal at best an attenuated connection to the factors 
articulated in Lopez. 
The full jurisdictional element used to charge Hill for Tibbs’s assault 
provided that the assault must “interfere[] with commercial or other economic 
activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct.”98 This 
jurisdictional element is notable when compared to the language of the others. 
Of the jurisdictional hooks, the first three, as well as subsection II of the fourth, 
explicitly reflect the categories that the Lopez Court held to be within the ambit 
of the Commerce Clause.99 The language of these jurisdictional hooks includes 
“channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce,” “travel 
 
 93. Id. (quoting United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2012)). The Sixth Circuit, 
however, goes on to provide substantive analysis of those jurisdictional elements rather than holding 
that their presence alone is sufficient. Coleman, 675 F.3d at 620–21 (concluding under Lopez that 
“SORNA bears a rational relationship to Congress’s power to regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce”). 
 94. 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 95. Id. at 472. 
 96. See e.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 600 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore have held that 
a ‘jurisdictional element is not alone sufficient to render [a challenged statute] constitutional. That 
argument . . . has no principled limit.’” (quoting United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th 
Cir. 2000))); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In discussing the lack of a 
jurisdictional element in Lopez, the Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must 
have such an element, or that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional, or that any 
statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional.”); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 
585 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, does not in and of itself 
insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.”). 
 97. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472. 
 98. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (2018). 
 99. The Commerce Clause permits regulation of “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; 
regulation of “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce”; and regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
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. . . across a State line,” and affecting “interstate or foreign commerce.”100 The 
language of subsection I of the HCPA’s fourth jurisdictional element, by 
contrast, does not make reference to any of the categories in Lopez. 
Initially, the charge against Hill contained both subsections of element 
four, which would have included a requirement that the prosecution show that 
the assault “otherwise affected” interstate commerce. 101  The prosecutor 
eventually dropped this element and solely relied on § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I), 
requiring only that Hill’s conduct “interfere[d] with commercial or other 
economic activity in which the victim [was] engaged at the time of the 
conduct.” 102  On its face, this subsection is plainly not tied to any of the 
established categories of Commerce Clause regulation the Supreme Court has 
recognized. The section does not even mention a connection to interstate or 
foreign commerce. One could even assume that the prosecutor identified 
weaknesses in showing that Hill’s actions “otherwise affect[ed] interstate or 
foreign commerce,” leading them to drop the charge altogether. 103  This 
weakness seems especially relevant given the court’s recognition that Amazon 
“did not miss any ‘critical pull times,’ or packaging deadlines, as a result of the 
incident because other areas of the facility absorbed the work.”104 
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit tells us that “the Hate Crimes Act’s 
interstate commerce element105 ensures that each prosecution under the Hate 
Crimes Act will bear the necessary relationship to commerce that renders the 
crime within Congress’s purview.” 106  And yet the Fourth Circuit never 
addresses which of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers expands that purview 
to include § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). As Judge Agee notes in his dissent in Hill, “this 
Circuit’s cases examining whether a jurisdictional element has ensured that 
individual prosecutions fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause power—
regardless of any other factors that also did so—have all addressed statutory 
language directly connecting the element to Congress’s constitutional 
 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B). 
 101. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 102. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)). 
 103. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)). 
 104. Id. at 194. The majority argues that Amazon’s ability to absorb the interruption is irrelevant 
since Congress may have determined that “the aggregate effect of assaults on individuals engaged in 
ongoing economic or commercial activity . . . amounts to a ‘substantial effect’ on interstate commerce.” 
Id. at 202–03. The court fails to reconcile why this aggregation is permissible considering the 
unambiguous language of Morrison where the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the argument that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). The “effect on individuals 
engaged in commerce” language is insufficient to render the assault aggregable economic activity. See 
supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 105. This language is especially interesting considering that the phrase “interstate commerce” does 
not even appear in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). 
 106. Hill, 927 F.3d at 208–09. 
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authority.” 107  For the Fourth Circuit majority, § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) is 
constitutional merely because it exists. 
Compare the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Hill to the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Taylor. In Taylor, the statutory language of the Hobbs Act used 
against the defendant was tied specifically to a realm of activity the Court has 
found regulable under the Commerce Clause. First, the relevant statutory 
section specified that a defendant’s “robbery or extortion” must “obstruct[], 
delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of an article or commodity in 
commerce.”108 On its face, this language is not wholly dissimilar to the HCPA’s 
mention of “commercial” activity in the jurisdictional element used to charge 
Hill. 109  Neither section makes explicit reference to interstate commerce, 
channels, instrumentalities, or to interstate travel. And yet, the Hobbs Act is 
further limited by its definition of the word commerce. In the statute’s 
definition section, commerce is defined as 
commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or 
Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a 
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point 
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State 
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which 
the United States has jurisdiction.110 
This inclusion, specifically the “commerce over which the United States has 
jurisdiction” language, essentially incorporates the categories of commerce that 
the Court has upheld. Since the Commerce Clause effectively determines what 
constitutes “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction,” this 
definition of commerce prevents the Hobbs Act from regulating commerce 
beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause. 
This is markedly different from the language of the jurisdictional hook at 
issue in Hill. The HCPA does not define or limit the phrase “commercial or 
economic activity” for the purposes of § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). There is no 
indication that the provision is meant to target only commercial activity with 
“interstate” effect or activity “over which the United States has jurisdiction.” 
In fact, given the HCPA’s broad language, it is hard to imagine what “economic 
activity” would not fall under the provision. Given that little human activity is 
exempt from ties to commerce, the HCPA’s wide net could encapsulate a broad 
range of tenuous “economic” activity. What if Tibbs was assaulted while 
walking to the grocery store? Surely human motion with the intent to engage 
in commerce is “commercial or . . . economic activity.” What if Tibbs was on 
 
 107. Id. at 214 (Agee, J., dissenting). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018). 
 109. Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). 
 110. Id. § 1951(b)(3). 
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his way to work or was on his way home from work? What if Tibbs was simply 
standing in an open field using his cell phone—a cell phone he paid for, with a 
data plan he paid for, using apps he paid for—all generating commoditized data, 
pinging off of towers owned by massive telecommunications companies who in 
turn sell that data for marketing purposes? To a surprising (and disturbing) 
extent, nearly any and all action is in some way commercial or economic.111 
The Fourth Circuit tosses such worries to the side, writing that the 
“slippery-slope concern” that would turn the Commerce Clause into 
“unfettered authority to regulate wholly intrastate conduct traditionally subject 
to regulation by the States . . . is not present here.”112 Not only is the concern 
present, it is looming.113 As Justice Thomas writes in his dissent in Taylor, “if 
these limitations are not respected, Congress will accumulate the general police 
power that the Constitution withholds.”114 
IV.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Aside from the constitutional failings, a bevy of policy considerations 
weigh against the Fourth Circuit’s use of the Commerce Clause in Hill. First, 
in allowing expansive prosecutions under the HCPA, states are relieved of any 
pressure to expand their protected classes for hate crimes. Why would Virginia 
feel the need to add sexual orientation protections to any of its statutes when 
the HCPA does the work for them? Hill teaches us that reliance on a federal 
criminal statute is misplaced. For one, hate crime prosecutions, at least those 
using § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I), will have to rely on flimsy constitutionality that 
 
 111. See, e.g., David Nield, How Location Tracking Actually Works on Your Smartphone, GIZMODO 
(Sept. 3, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://gizmodo.com/how-location-tracking-actually-works-on-your-
smartphone-1828356441 [https://perma.cc/WB95-3X3R]; Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s 
Likely To See an Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007 
/01/15/business/media/15everywhere.html [https://perma.cc/TZV3-DZ78 (dark archive)]; Zack 
Whittaker, US Cell Carriers Are Selling Access to Your Real-Time Phone Location Data, ZDNET (May 14, 
2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-cell-carriers-selling-access-to-real-time-location-
data/ [https://perma.cc/3Q45-ZBCE]. 
 112. Hill, 927 F.3d at 205. 
 113. For example, federal prosecutors may (as they sometimes do) exercise authority under such 
federal criminal statutes to second guess local law enforcement decisions since “the [Justice] 
Department’s own express policies reflect that increased federal involvement in local matters is often 
based on the fact that federal prosecutors disagree with state judgments about the appropriate sentence 
for criminal conduct and what makes an ‘effective’ prosecution.” Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and 
Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 576 (2011). At the same 
time, state and local officials may abuse such federal laws to circumvent the political will of their local 
communities. Id. at 577–78. (“[I]t is not necessarily the case that local officials making [the decision to 
have federal prosecutors intervene in local prosecutions] reflect the views of the larger electorate in a 
community. Nor is there any assurance that they are selecting the right cases for this differential 
sentencing treatment or that allowing cases to be handpicked for harsher treatment comports with 
notions of due process or federalism. And of course, there remains the substantive issue of whether 
federal involvement and the higher sentences it brings, on balance, produce better policy.”). 
 114. Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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leaves opportunities for appeal and reversal wide open.115 This concern—the 
constant threat of defendants challenging the constitutionality of their 
convictions—was theorized from the very outset of federal hate crime 
regulation. 116  Hate crime victims deserve more consistent and more stable 
prosecutions of their offenders. 
Prosecutions such as Hill’s also invite circuit splits. Should the victims of 
hate crimes hope the crime against them occurs in a circuit with an expansive 
view of § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)? To borrow language from due process 
scholarship, the provision at issue in Hill is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive. First, it is underinclusive in that there will be an eventual hate 
crime that the Act does not reach—a case so “un-economic” that no reasonable 
court would find it has come under the Commerce Clause’s power. Second, the 
provision is overinclusive because it will open the door for an unconstitutional 
extension of Congressional police power. If a punch is regulable as commerce, 
what is not? Victims of hate crimes will find themselves trapped between federal 
law that cannot constitutionally reach their attacker and state law that refuses 
to do so. That is not to mention the Fourth Circuit’s contribution to the 
growing split between circuits struggling to determine what role the presence 
of a jurisdictional hook plays in evaluating the constitutionality of Commerce 
Clause legislation. 
A. Structural Solution: Constitutionally Influencing State-Level Criminal Justice 
Reforms 
The simplest solution, at least immediately, would be to strike 
§ 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) from the HCPA. However, there is still the concern that 
the Act unconstitutionally infringes on state police power generally and violates 
principles of federalism.117 Even ruling the Act unconstitutional as a whole and 
striking it down would not be the end of the matter. Although the Commerce 
Clause may be unable to reach hate crimes, that does not mean Congress as a 
body is powerless. If Congress wants to flex its constitutional muscle, it could, 
for instance, do so under the Spending Clause.118 
 
 115. Justifiably so. 
 116. Christopher Chorba, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and 
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 355–66 (2001). 
 117. See, e.g., Steven R. Eatherly, The “Bergholz Barbers”: The Hate Crimes Prevention Act Is 
Unconstitutional as Exceeding Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
453, 484–85 (2016) (arguing that the HCPA is unconstitutional as it erodes the ability of state and 
local law enforcement to shape their localities). 
 118. The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides Congress the enumerated power to “lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
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In fact, Congress has used the Spending Clause to exert power over the 
states that it could not otherwise wield.119 As Justice Rehnquist explained in 
South Dakota v. Dole, 120  “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s 
‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of 
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.” 121  In the 
legislation challenged in Dole, Congress, believing itself to be unable to raise 
the national drinking age to twenty-one, conditioned the receipt of federal 
highway funding on individual states doing so.122 Congress could, in theory, 
condition federal funding for state and local law enforcement on the broadening 
of state-level hate crime protections.123 
There are several benefits to exerting Spending Clause power to address 
hate crimes. First, prosecution of hate crimes is firmly within state police 
power. 124  Prosecutors and victims need not worry about inevitable appeals 
hampering their pursuit of justice. Second, this change has, at least in theory, 
broad appeal across the political spectrum. For one, it expands the power of 
local law enforcement and prosecutors, appeasing those with high trust in police 
(a trust increasingly split along partisan lines).125 At the same time, it expands 
upon our growing appreciation of bias, especially against marginalized 
 
 119. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress conditioning 
receipt of federal highway funds on raising minimum drinking age was within the authority of the 
Constitution’s Spending Clause). 
 120. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 121. Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). 
 122. Id. at 205. 
 123. A similar approach was employed in the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013 which 
reduced federal funding for states that did not provide the DOJ with data concerning deaths of those 
in state custody. Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 60105 
(2018)). The Center for American Progress has similarly outlined several areas in which Congressional 
appropriations to the DOJ can impact state-level criminal justice reforms. MIKE CROWLEY & ED 
CHUNG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, CONGRESS CAN LEAD ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
THROUGH FUNDING CHOICES 1 (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/09 
/07054711/DOJGrant-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CBB-P8GN]. Similar approaches are also proposed 
as a part of current police reform bills in the wake of the high-profile police killing of George Floyd. 
Catie Edmonson, Democrats Unveil Sweeping Bill Targeting Police Misconduct and Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/politics/democrats-police-misconduct-bill-
protests.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/WZX4-7GUR (dark archive)] 
(“[Legislation] would also condition some federal grants on the adoption of anti-discrimination training 
and practices.”). 
 124. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (holding that the 
state’s police power embraces regulations that, among other things, promote the public health, morals, 
or safety). 
 125. See generally, Anna Brown, Republicans More Likely than Democrats To Have Confidence in Police, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/republicans-more-
likely-than-democrats-to-have-confidence-in-police/ [https://perma.cc/WQ6X-9F3L] (discussing 
differences in how Republicans and Democrats view the role and performance of police). 
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communities—including those with disabilities 126  and members of the 
LGBTQ+ community127—not traditionally protected by this type of legislation. 
B. Policy Considerations: Is Hate Crime Legislation Worth Saving? 
Any progress toward saving the HCPA also depends more fundamentally 
on whether hate crime legislation is effective in reaching its perceived goals.128 
Growing reevaluation of hate crime legislation has brought its effectiveness and 
motivation into question. Hate crime legislation may fall into the category of 
“symbolic politics” as a largely symbolic reassurance to the public, rather than a 
substantive effort to combat bias.129 Under the theory of symbolic politics, the 
true beneficiaries of hate crime legislation are politicians seeking to “obtain the 
political support of those interested” by providing a mere “pat on the back.”130 
At the same time, criticisms abound regarding public misunderstanding of the 
“typical” hate crime defendant, commonly believed to be a violent hate group 
member. In reality, “[t]he misconception that hate groups, which include 
skinheads, neo-Nazis, white nationalists and black separatists groups, cause hate 
crimes is unfounded.” 131  Rather, most charged under hate crime laws are 
younger males in their teens to early twenties acting together.132 Less than five 
percent are members of hate groups.133 Further, many offenders may not be 
biased themselves but were “following the lead of a more biased peer.”134 
Research also suggests that “hate” may not even be the driving force 
behind what most consider hate crimes. A 2011 study found that hate groups 
 
 126. See, e.g., Debra McKinney, The Invisible Hate Crime, INTELLIGENCE REP. (2018), 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/invisible-hate-crime#ongoing-fight 
[https://perma.cc/5S4M-QRYL]. 
 127. The Human Rights Campaign reports that only twenty states address hate or bias crimes 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity while eleven address crimes based only on sexual 
orientation. State Maps of Law & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/state-
maps/hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/A4EV-L7GM] (last updated Jan. 2, 2020). A 2019 FBI report of 
hate crimes occurring in 2018 found that one in five were motivated by anti-LGBTQ bias. FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2019), 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018 [https://perma.cc/C992-4VGZ]. 
 128. See, e.g., James Doubeck, How Well Do Hate Crime Laws Really Work?, NPR (June 28, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/28/417231920/how-well-do-hate-crime-laws-
really-work [https://perma.cc/L9PJ-PB8D]; Dashka Slater, The Fire on the 57 Bus in Oakland, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/magazine/the-fire-on-the-57-bus-
in-oakland.html [https://perma.cc/5DLR-HR7A (dark archive)]. For a broad criticism of hate crime 
legislation, see generally Briana Alongi, Note, The Negative Ramifications of Hate Crime Legislation: It’s 
Time To Reevaluate Whether Hate Crime Laws Are Beneficial to Society, 37 PACE L. REV. 326 (2017). 
 129. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal 
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (2000).  
 130. Id. at 1250–51.  
 131. Alongi, supra note 128, at 332.  
 132. Slater, supra note 128. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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had no influence on hate crime levels in the United States between 2002 and 
2008. 135  That same study found that economic factors like poverty and 
unemployment are strongly connected to hate crimes.136 This suggests that hate 
crime victims are targeted not for specific protected characteristics but because 
they generally belong to a social group considered more “vulnerable” than that 
of the defendant.137 In this way, “symbolic” hate crime legislation could be 
viewed as a placation of sorts to avoid the more arduous policy efforts required 
to address underlying poverty and unemployment inequalities. 
Still, there remains the retributive argument that harsher punishment for 
hate crimes reflects a moral stand in favor of protecting and promoting tolerance 
for oppressed minorities. Yet, some have criticized increased penalties as 
depriving hate crime perpetrators of any meaningful way to come to terms with 
the “bias” that motivated their crime.138 In some instances, increased penalties 
may even solidify the offender’s bias by contributing to a worldview in which 
relations between “competing groups” are based upon characteristics like race, 
gender, religion, or sexual orientation. 139  There are similar doubts about 
increased penalization and its effect on victims.140 
CONCLUSION 
Hill’s conviction under the HCPA is unconstitutional. The Fourth 
Circuit’s reliance on Taylor to circumvent the reality that the foundational 
Commerce Clause cases weigh against its holding is unpersuasive and 
misleading. In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit demonstrates the sort of judicial 
gymnastics required when Congress pushes its power under the Commerce 
Clause beyond the pale of constitutionality. Further, even if we assume, as the 
court does, that the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook is sufficient for ensuring 
constitutional compliance, true analysis of the jurisdictional element used to 
 
 135. Matt E. Ryan & Peter T. Leeson, Hate Groups and Hate Crime, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
256, 257–58 (2011) (“There’s little evidence that hate groups have an important relationship to hate 
crime in America.”).  
 136. Id. at 260. 
 137. Id. at 256 (“[W]hen people endure economic hardship they get frustrated. They take their 
frustration out on vulnerable social groups, such as ethnic, sexual and religious minorities.”).  
 138. Scholarship has indicated that a restorative justice approach better emphasizes the 
perpetrators’ need to heal their damaged relationships with the victims, other community members, 
and themselves by focusing on reparation rather than stigmatization. Mark Walters & Carolyn Hoyle, 
Healing Harms and Engendering Tolerance: The Promise of Restorative Justice for Hate Crime, in HATE 
CRIME: CONCEPTS, POLICY, FUTURE DIRECTIONS 228, 230–31 (Neil Chakraborti ed., 2010). 
 139. Beverley A. McPhail, Hating Hate: Policy Implications of Hate Crime Legislation, 74 SOC. SERV. 
REV. 635, 646 (2000). 
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convict Hill demonstrates that it is plainly beyond the established bounds of 
the Commerce Clause. 
No sane individual would condone Hill’s actions. And yet in the effort to 
justify his conviction, the Fourth Circuit has both extended the Commerce 
Clause and given it new meaning. This raises questions that date back to the 
very founding of our democracy when James Madison wrote his now ubiquitous 
maxim that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
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